(to be published at: Diaspora Studies (Tandon) Key words: History, Citizenship, India, Africa, colonisation, South Asia
as: "a system of justice that should conform as much to their own law as is compatible within the principles of ours." 7 (3) In general, the South Asians in East Africa were seen as British subjects. Most of them were already part of the British colonial system when they arrived in the region.
From a legal point of view, this placed them somewhere between having civic rights and being subject to customary law. Over the years, South Asians were appointed to the legislative council and would turn to civic law when they felt that it suited their interests best. Sometimes, they used the legal and political connections with London to find support, and were thus able to bypass local colonial officials. In other cases, it was the colonial government in India that took up their case and provided them with assistance.
In other words, they were less powerful than the colonial rulers, but often successfully used a wide range of connections and options to persuade colonial officials to support them.
However, we have to recognise that 'natives' and 'settlers' belong together. The native is a native only in the context of settlers, while settlers are settlers only in the context of natives. In the US, the natives (Indians) became natives only after the arrival of the white settlers. In East Africa, meanwhile, the issue of the settler and the native is very complex, because of its particular historical legacy. The prototype of the settler in East Africa was, of course, the white man. The hegemony of the white man was based on his technological, military and economic dominance. However, it was reinforced by law in the constitution of the colonial state. The East African colonial states recognised two types of political identity: civic and ethnic. The former was protected by civic rights, which were written into civil law and upheld by the state. These rights were predominantly intended to protect those who were considered to be 'civilised', in essence, the white settlers.
The natives, meanwhile, were defined as 'subjects' not 'civics', and were therefore not covered by civic rights and the civic identity. Instead, the colonial states created a different identity for them: the ethnic identity. This was defined by the customs of the 7 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 63. ethnic groups, including the sense of belonging to an ancestral area. These customs were recognised by the state and reinforced by so-called customary law. The introduction of 'Native Authorities' facilitated the regulation, and often the enforcement, of customary laws. So, at the local level, the state spoke the language of culture and customs and not that of rights. What is important here is that the non-white settlers like Arabs and, in particular, Asians, did not accept this distinction. Moreover, some of them were economically welloff and well-educated (often in the heart of the empire, e.g. London, Oxford or Cambridge). They were therefore able to criticise the often discriminatory colonial practices. Sometimes, they used their background as British subjects, as well as their 'Britishness' in terms of language, education and knowledge of the law and jurisdiction, to strike back from within the system. Yet, on other occasions, they made their point by showing off their moral integrity. This was the case, for example, when the extremely rich Asian African businessman Abdulla Karimjee opened his private swimming club in Tanga for all races and creeds after he was refused entry to the 'white man's club' in the 1950s.
Nevertheless, the increasing quest for equality by the natives and non-European migrants (especially South Asians and Arabs in the case of East Africa) gained ground on the historical path to independence. An important part of the struggle for civic rights and the emancipation of the Asians was strikingly realised in a discourse about the natives. Often, the Asians would argue for equal opportunities with whites, e.g. in cases where they wished to have access to the same fertile land as the white settlers. The whites, however, argued that these rights could not be granted, because the Asians would almost certainly use them to exploit the natives, and it was the Europeans' responsibility to prevent this. This argument was often used to protect colonial interests against those of the Asians. Nevertheless, the latter were quick to remind the colonisers of their importance as both middlemen between the African producers and the Europeans, and agents in the civil service. Returning briefly to the marriage between Abdulla Karimjee and Kianga Ranniger, at first sight this was a union between a daughter of German white settlers and a British subject. Indeed, if Hitler had not come to power in Germany, the young married couple would probably have left it at that. Nevertheless, after Hitler became Reichskansler in 1933, the couple eventually decided that it was in their interests for Kianga to become a British subject, as they were experiencing increasing difficulties in their travels within East Africa, to India and, especially, to the UK.
Usually, a married women was able obtain the citizenship status of her husband.
As a consequence, it was initially thought by the couple that this request would be a straightforward matter; if the marriage was legal, and if Abdulla Karimjee was a British subject, his wife would, on the basis of the marriage, also become a British subject and 9 For an excellent summary of this long but interesting debate, see Robert G. Gregory, Quest for Equality. Africa, 1900 -1967 (Oriental Blackswan, 1993 The main evidence was a letter to Kianga confirming that she voluntarily converted to Islam and that she was married to Abdulla. Furthermore, Kianga argued that she had many British friends, had been refused membership of the German club in Tanga and was ostracized by the Nazis, who she defied. In addition, the Mulla of the Bohra sect produced a letter stating that he was in charge of the marriage ceremony in 1933. Note that this history could be read as acceptance of customary law by the British.
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wider range of opportunities would come to the fore after India and Pakistan gained their independence, as we will see in the following sections.
Partition of India
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There is a striking contrast between the attitude of the Indian government to the overseas Indian community before and then after independence (1947). Prior to independence, both the Indian government and the nationalist movement were very concerned about the position of South Asian (indentured) labourers overseas, as well as the interests of Indian businessmen in the diaspora. Gandhi had set the example in his pledge for South Asians in South Africa, but this was a rule rather than an exception in the country's foreign policy. After independence, however, a new foreign policy in line with India's new status in the world was introduced. The first prime minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, argued that if India wanted to make a stand against imperialism, it could only do so by not being imperialistic itself. He therefore advised the Indians overseas to integrate and warned them not to expect any help from India.
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The partitioning of India complicated the issue of the nationality of the South Asians in East Africa. Before 1947, everyone born in the British dominions was a British subject, meaning that one simply had to be born in any territory under the sovereignty of the British Crown. In general, British subjects had the right to travel within and to other dominions, as well as to the UK. British citizens, meanwhile, had the same right, but were either living in the UK or were allowed to both live and vote there. In order to clarify the status of its existing and former subjects, the British parliament passed the British Nationality Act in 1948. This legislation was part of the decolonisation process, and its aim was to guarantee the status of those who were still British subjects in its remaining colonies. The Act provided that:
(1) All British subjects who had links (business, family or otherwise) with the UK would become "citizens of the UK and Colonies." (2) and (3) It is noteworthy that Indian and Pakistani passports were hardly ever obtained, except in a few cases where elderly family members chose to retire to one of those countries. This option ended in 1955, and neither country proposed new opportunities for citizenship. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan became less important as a business partner of the Indian settlers in East Africa. 26 Some researchers maintain that families employed strategic management in the way that they distributed the citizenship options within the family. They also argue that because South Asian women generally stayed at home, it was reasoned that they did not need a passport from one of the East African states, as the main benefit thereof was the acquisition of a trading licence. On the other hand, having a British passport was advantageous because it would mean that the family could easily move to the UK or elsewhere. 27 However, none of the families that I interviewed recalled having a particularly conscious policy about these issues; there were no family meetings where the allocation of citizenships to family members was discussed. In practice, it was pretty clear that some would apply for local citizenship, especially those who were active in East African-based businesses or had professional jobs, whereas others who were, for example, working or studying abroad would obtain other passports.
buildings, was not directed against the South Asians specifically, they were nevertheless hit extremely hard, particularly the small traders and those with menial clerical and semi-skilled jobs. Accordingly, as a consequence of government policies, the mass exodus of Indians began.
In Tanzania The new African states and their local societies expected the South Asians to become part of African society and to demonstrate their loyalty by accepting their new citizenship status, but only about a third did so, as set out in Table 2 . Europeans, initially welcomed the transition. The South Asians in particular did so because they believed that Amin would limit the extent of the anti-Asian campaign.
Those Asians who belonged to the Ismaili religion were also pleased to see a Muslim replace a Christian as president, and had given generous support to the building of mosques and schools to promote Islam among Africans. However, their hopes were shortlived. Little more than a year later, on 5th August 1972, Amin, who was now president, gave his infamous 'Asian Farewell Speech' in which he gave Asians 90 days to pack up and leave, making no distinction between citizens and non-citizens. His main argument was that British Asians had come to Uganda to build the country's railway, but this had now been completed. In this speech, as well as in earlier ones, Amin accused the Asians of the "economic sabotage" of the country; they were -in his view -not only unwilling to invest, but were also removing resources. The problem with these kinds of accusation is, of course, that they cannot be proved to be true or untrue. Moreover, the situation was more complex than Amin suggested. The railway was indeed finished, but many of those who had come to help to construct it had later found a living as traders and artisans. Meanwhile, others had arrived not to build the railway, but to work as colonial civil servants. This is not to say that South Asians were not involved in the economic sabotage of the country, especially in the latter stages of uncertain political rule. However, evidence for such allegations should have been brought before an independent Ugandan court.
All South Asians now knew that they had to leave the country, whether they were citizens or not. Their houses, shops and other properties were in danger of being seized, and their physical and emotional wellbeing was at risk, not least because of Amin's control of the military. In the last few weeks of the ultimatum period, some 50,000 Asians left with just hand luggage and no more than £55 in cash. By 1973, no more than 1,000 South Asians remained in Uganda.
To most of the South Asians in the country, their expulsion came as a complete surprise. Initially, many who had heard the Asian farewell speech or read about it in the newspapers simply did not believe that it would ever become a reality. Yet even those whose Ugandan citizenship had appeared to be fully established found that they were required to produce fresh evidence, which was ultimately rejected. Even the Ismaili community and the Madhvani and Mehta families, who owned famous business houses and had a long history in Uganda, were deprived of their citizenship.
When the first groups of South Asians who had been resident in or citizens of local economy or local politics because settled strangers always have an 'escape route'.
Moreover, if they do take up local citizenship or become politically active, they are said to be doing so for personal gain and not to serve the country. I argue that these strangers still have to navigate between being an insider and an outsider at different places and times. Even after three or four generations of running a local business, paying taxes, and spending money on charities, hospitals, dispensaries and the like, they find that this is never enough to be accepted as locally loyal. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town, Mahmood Mamdani rhetorically asks: When does a settler become a native? And his short answer is: from the point of view of ethnic citizenship, NEVER.
In this paper, I argue that there was a great deal of continuity in the rhetoric of 'longing and belonging' of the South Asians in East Africa. Despite 100 years of debates and change, the rhetoric is still remarkably similar. In order to understand the ambivalent relations between strangers and local society through the generations, I
have focussed on the descendants of migrants who eventually settled in their new environments for at least three generations. They are often referred to as 'third or fourth or more' generation migrants, despite the fact that they did not migrate themselves; they (and their parents) were born and raised in the new countries, which they have made their own. This means that they enjoyed their education, know the local language and will probably get married locally (although frequently within their own ethnic group). Often, but not always, they carry local passports or have obtained local citizenship. Despite this, their loyalty towards local society is at stake in the discourses on migration and citizenship. The debate on citizenship and belonging has become the centre of academic and public debate since the 1990s in Europe and the US. However, historical cases in colonial contexts might shed some light on long-term continuity in such discussions.
